Footnotes

1.Brett Heino andJames Dahlstrom, “War Crimes and the ParisianRégulationApproach: Representations of the Crisis of Antipodean Fordism,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 74(2014–15): 95–117. Google Scholar

2.Mark Elam, “Puzzling out the Post-Fordist Debate: Technology, Markets and Institutions,”inPost-Fordism: A Reader, ed.Ash Amin(:Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 43–70. Google Scholar

3.Brett Heino, “The State, Class and Occupational Health and Safety: Locating the Capitalist State’s Role in the Regulation of OHS in NSW,” Labour & Industry 23, no. 2(2013):150–67. Although he does not use the term (he dubs it “experimentation/ideational evolution”), Treuren provides an excellent account of the physiology of institutional searching;Gerry Treuren, “How and Why Do Institutions Change? A Four Phase Framework for the Description of Institutional Development,” Journal of Economic and Social Policy 7, no. 2(2003):51–67. Google Scholar

4.Alain Lipietz, “Fears and Hopes: The Crisis of the Liberal-Productivist Model and its Green Alternative,” Capital & Class 37, no. 1(2013):127–41. Google Scholar

5.John Buchanan,Damian Oliver andChris Briggs, “Solidarity Reconstructed: The Impact of the Accord on Relations within the Australian Union Movement,” Journal of Industrial Relations 56, no. 2(2014):288–307. Google Scholar

6.Heino, “The State, Class and Occupational Health and Safety,” 158–59. Google Scholar

7.Often by those explicitly influenced by regulationist concepts and methodology. See, for example:Christopher Lloyd, “Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political Economy of Regulation,” Australian Economic History Review 42, no. 3(2002):238–66;Christopher Lloyd, “Australian Capitalism Since 1992: A New Regime of Accumulation,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 61(2008):30–55;Ray Broomhill, “Australian Economic Booms in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 61(2008):12–29;Lynne Chester, “The Australian Variant of Neoliberal Capitalism,”inNeoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market, ed.Damien Cahill,Lindy Edwards andFrank Stilwell(:Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 153–79. Google Scholar

8.Gerry Treuren, “The Concept of the State in Australian Industrial Relations,” Labour & Industry 11, no. 2(2000):75–98. Google Scholar

9.Brett Heino, “Capitalism, Regulation Theory and Australian Labour Law: Towards a New Theoretical Model,” Capital & Class 39, no. 3(2015):453–72. Google Scholar

10. “IR pace-setters,”according toJustine Evessonet al., “‘Lowering the Standards’: From Awards toWork Choicesin Retail and Hospitality Collective Agreements”(:Workplace Research Centre, 2007), 49. Google Scholar

11.Robert Boyer, “Perspectives on the Wage-Labour Nexus,”inRégulation Theory: The State of the Art, ed.Robert Boyer andYves Saillard(:Routledge, 2002), 73–79. Google Scholar

12.As Stone does;Katherine Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace(:Cambridge University Press, 2004). Google Scholar

13.Heino, “Capitalism, Regulation Theory and Australian Labour Law.” Google Scholar

14.For some useful sources within this tradition, seeJohn Burgess andIain Campbell, “The Nature and Dimensions of Precarious Employment in Australia,” Labour & Industry 8, no. 3(1998):5–21;Iain Campbell, “Casual Work and Casualisation: How Does Australia Compare?” Labour & Industry 15, no. 2(2004):85–111;Guy Standing, Precariat: The New Dangerous Class(:Bloomsbury Academic, 2011). Google Scholar

15.Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience(:NLB, 1979), 116–22. Google Scholar

16.Bob Jessop, “Revisiting the Regulation Approach: Critical Reflections on the Contradictions, Dilemmas, Fixes and Crisis Dynamics of Growth Regimes,” Capital & Class 37, no. 1(2013):5–24. Google Scholar

17.Bob Jessop andNgai-Ling Sum, Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in their Place(:Edward Elgar, 2006), 42. Google Scholar

18.Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order(:Polity Press, 1992), 1–3. Google Scholar

19.Often with considerable analytical and methodological conflict. Contrast, for example,Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation;Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order;Jessop andSum, Beyond the Regulation Approach. Google Scholar

20.Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, 3–7. Google Scholar

21.Summarised inHeino andDahlstrom, “War Crimes,” 102–103. Google Scholar

22.Heino, “The State, Class and Occupational Health and Safety,” 162. Google Scholar

23.Lipietz, “Fears and Hopes,” 129–30. Google Scholar

24.Heino andDahlstrom, “War Crimes,” 103–104;Heino, “Capitalism, Regulation Theory and Australian Labour Law.” Google Scholar

25.Burgess andCampbell, “The Nature and Dimensions of Precarious Employment,” 8. Google Scholar

26.Standing, Precariat, 26–58. Google Scholar

27.Campbell, “Casual Work,” 85. Google Scholar

28.Robert Boyer, “Wage Formation in Historical Perspective: The French Experience,”inThe Parisian Regulation School, ed.Bob Jessop(:Edward Elgar, 2001), 148–67. Google Scholar

29.Buchanan,Oliver andBriggs, “Solidarity Reconstructed,” 296. Google Scholar

30.Heino, “Capitalism, Regulation Theory and Australian Labour Law.” Google Scholar

31.Justice Macken, “Report to the Minister for Industrial Relations,”no. 1074, 1982, p.85. Google Scholar

32.John Burgess andIain Campbell, “Casual Employment in Australia: Growth, Characteristics, a Bridge or a Trap?” Economic and Labour Relations Review 9, no. 1(1998):31–54;John Howe, “The Job Creation Function of the State: A New Subject for Labour Law,” Australian Journal of Labour Law 14, no. 3(2001):1–27. Although they do not use the term “antipodean Fordism,” they note that the standard employment relationship only took off in the mid-twentieth century, particularly after World War II. Google Scholar

33.Thom Workman, If You’re in My Way, I’m Walking(:Fernwood Publishing, 2009), 12–14. Google Scholar

34.Saturday morning work was often specially recompensed. For example, in theShop Assistants (Newcastle) and (Metropolitan) Awards Case, in theIndustrial Arbitration Reports, NSW(hereafterAR) 54(1955):871, 885–886, Justice De Baun provided for an allowance of 10 shillings for workers thus engaged. It is telling, however, that this was awarded following a refusal by the Full Bench to grant a five-day working week, in essence representing a premium in lieu of the full benefits of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus;The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 17(1985):275. Google Scholar

35.C. P. Mills andE. G. A. Lambert, eds, The Australian Industrial Law Review 13, no. 37(1971):3;C. P. Mills andE. G. A. Lambert,eds, The Australian Industrial Law Review 14, no. 11(1972):3;The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 17(1985):276. Google Scholar

36.Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A History from Flood to Ebb Tide(:Cambridge University Press, 2008), 41–71. Google Scholar

37.Dennis Mortimer, “Trade Union and Management Strategy: A Case Study of Compulsory Unionism,” Employment Relations Record 1, no. 2(2001):81–97. Google Scholar

38. Ibid., 86. Google Scholar

39.A threat made very apparent by the preparedness of the Transport Workers’ Union to enforce boycotts to ensure compulsory unionism;Nikola Balnave andDennis Mortimer, “Union Security in Retail: Legislative Intervention or Collective Agreement,” International Journal of Employment Studies 13, no. 1(2005):81–105. Google Scholar

40. Ibid., 98–102. Google Scholar

41. Voice 5, no. 1(1973):3. Google Scholar

42.Mortimer, “Trade Union and Management Strategy,” 81. Google Scholar

43.Michael Johnston, “Industrial Notes,” Voice 5, no. 2(1973):8. Google Scholar

44.Heino andDahlstrom, “War Crimes,” 109–110. Google Scholar

45.For example, until the early-1970s manufacturers largely dominated distribution chains, deciding what to produce and often controlling prices through resale price maintenance practices. The role of the retail sector in this arrangement was as an intermediary, marketing products made available by manufacturers. See, for example,Stuart Rosewarne, “The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties: Part 2,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 16(1984):75–92;David Burch andGeoff Lawrence, “Supermarket Own Brands, Supply Chains and the Transformation of the Agri-Food System,” International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 13, no. 1(2005):1–18. Google Scholar

46.Stuart Rosewarne, “The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties: Part 1,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 15(1983):18–38. Google Scholar

47.Additionally, full-time employees often proved reluctant to work outside their normal spread of hours. In NSW, the introduction of Friday night and Saturday afternoon trading in 1984 was made conditional upon a savings clause being inserted in theShop Assistants (General Shops) Interim (State) Award, which provided that full-time staff employed prior to 23 July, 1984, could not be compelled to work outside ordinary hours:The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 12(1985):198–99. Google Scholar

48.Brian O’Neill, “A New Minimum Wage of $225,” Shop and Distributive Worker, Summer1981, 3;In re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award and Other Awards, AR(April–June1983, Pt 2):283;The Australian Industrial Law Review 26, no. 7(1984):117. Google Scholar

49.For examples of strike action in NSW, seeThe Australian Industrial Law Review 21, no. 9(1979):137;Damon Frith, “Business as Usual as Workers Protest,” The Australian Financial Review, 10 November1988, 6. Google Scholar

50.The fact that strikes remained limited in retail can be gleaned from the comparatively paltry strike statistics for the sector as a whole from 1975–80 (the period for which we have specific data on the incidence of strikes in the retail sector specifically). Generally speaking, retail strikes were small in number and usually drew in relatively few employees. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics, Australia, no. 6101.0, for 1975–80. Subsequent iterations ofLabour Statisticsdo not specifically measure strike statistics for the retail sector. This in itself would appear to tell a story as to how negligible strike action in the sector really was. Google Scholar

51. In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2), AR(July–September1977, Pt 3): 555, 569. It is worth noting that the initial trend towards retail precarity was primarily one of casualisation. Unlike the well-established categories of “full-time” and “casual,” “part-time” was a much rarer feature of Australian awards into the 1980s. Indeed, theShop Employees (State) Awardof 1982 provided that part-time workers could only be women or men over 60;NSW Industrial Commission, “Shop Employees (State) Award,” NSW Industrial Gazette 226(1982):1716, 1722. Google Scholar

52. In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2), AR(July–September1977, Pt 3):555, 568–70. Google Scholar

53. In re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award and Another Award, AR(July–September1980, Pt 3):555, 556. Google Scholar

54.In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2), AR(July–September1977, Pt 3):555, 575–84;“Momentous Decision for Young Unemployed,” Voice 9, no. 4(1977); 7. Google Scholar

55.C. P. Mills andE. G. A. Lambert, eds, Australian Industrial Law Review 14, no. 30(1972):6. Google Scholar

56.Justice Macken noted that “the RTA was compelled to adopt a rather ambivalent attitude towards trading hours because of the deep divisions amongst its members with respect to suggested changes”;Justice Macken, “Report to the Minister for Industrial Relations,” 38. Google Scholar

57. Ibid., 38–39. The RTA noted that only 10 per cent of their membership supported de-regulated trading hours, the same 10 per cent who supported Sunday trading, namely, large retailers;“Shopping Hours Inquiry,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, March1983, 3. Google Scholar

58.Michael Lyons, “An Appealing Outcome? Industrial Arbitration and Extended Retail Trading Hours in New South Wales in the 1980s,” International Journal of Employment Studies 13, no. 1(2005):113. Google Scholar

59. Ibid. Google Scholar

60.A move supported by NSW Premier Neville Wran:“Wran Supports Extended Hours,” The Canberra Times, 29 August1983, 3. Google Scholar

61.Justice Macken, “Report to the Minister for Industrial Relations,” 102–10. Google Scholar

62.“Shop-Hours Proposals Accepted by Unions,” The Canberra Times, 22 October1983, 8. Google Scholar

63.“Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Union Regarding Economic Policy, February 1983,”inFrank Stilwell, The Accord … and Beyond: The Political Economy of the Labor Government(:Pluto Press, 1986), 159–76. Google Scholar

64.Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism(:NLB, 1978). Google Scholar

65.NSW Industrial Commission, Statement Matter, nos 1529 and 1564 (2 August1984), unreported. These agreements were understood as thequid pro quofor union acceptance of de-regulated trading hours;J. Taylor, “Extended Shopping Hours Have Been Delayed Again,” Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August1984, 3. Google Scholar

66.The RTA noted rather sheepishly in early 1984 that“the retail industry is the last major employing industry maintaining a 40 hour week”; “38 Hour Week,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, March–April1984, 5. Google Scholar

67.Which, since 1972, was the prevailing standard in NSW. See NSW Industrial Commission,“In reShift Workers Case 1972,” AR 72, pt 8(1972):633. Google Scholar

68.Robert Debus, NSW Legislative Assembly (LA), Hansard, 1 October1985, 7374. Google Scholar

69. The Australian Industrial Law Review 26, no. 18(1984):294. Google Scholar

70.NSW SDA Official, interview with author, 22 November2013. Google Scholar

71.Lyons, “An Appealing Outcome,” 114. See alsoPat Hills, NSW LA, Hansard, 19 November1985, 9844;P. F. Watkins, NSW Legislative Council (LC), Hansard, 26 November1985, 10515. Google Scholar

73.Pat Hills, NSW LA, Hansard, 14 August1984, 66. The main issue was that the agreements with the six major retailers provided for time-and-a-half rates for all Saturday work, a scheme unpalatable to other general stores; Pat Hills, NSW LA, Hansard, 20 November1985, 10101. Google Scholar

75.Designated “small,” “special” and “confectionary” shops remained governed by theShop Employees (State) Award. Google Scholar

76. The Australian Industrial Law Review 26, no. 18(1984):295(emphasis added). Google Scholar

77. The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 17(1985):275–78. Google Scholar

78.“Shop Award Proceeding Smoothly,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, May–June1985, 5. Google Scholar

79.“RTA Action to Free Shop Award,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, March–April1985, 3. Google Scholar

80.As their behaviour should rightly be regarded:Lyons, “An Appealing Outcome,” 119–20. Google Scholar

81. The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 17(1985):278. Google Scholar

82. Ibid., 276. Google Scholar

83.In lieu, they were given a small allowance for shifts longer than four hours, representing a return to the situation prior to Justice Macken’s 1977 decision originally extending penalty rates to casuals. See“In reShift Workers Case 1972.” Google Scholar

84. The Australian Industrial Law Review 27, no. 17(1985):276. Google Scholar

85. Ibid. Google Scholar

86. Ibid., (emphasis added). Google Scholar

87. Ibid. Google Scholar

88. Ibid., 277(emphasis added). Google Scholar

89. Ibid., 276–77. Google Scholar

90.See, for example, “Shop Award Proceeding Smoothly,” 5. Google Scholar

91.Australian Retailers Association, “Submission to the Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems,”1982, Series Z441, Box 30, Noel Butlin Archives Centre. Google Scholar

92. Ibid., 25. Google Scholar

93. Ibid., 15–16. Google Scholar

94.Lyon, “An Appealing Outcome,” 115. Google Scholar

95.E. Campbell, “Unions to Fight Pay Cut Flow-On,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19 August1985, 2. Google Scholar

96.Re Shop Employees (State) Award, inIndustrial Reports 15(1987):27. Google Scholar

97.Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place(:Polity Press, 1990). Google Scholar

98.Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia, 55. Google Scholar

99.Influence oiled by substantial financial contributions. For example, in 1983 the SDA made a $20,000 contribution to ALP head office, the largest such sum that year:Peter Collins, NSW LA, Hansard, 20 November1985, 10089. Google Scholar

100.See, for example,John Davis Garland, NSW LC, Hansard, 1 October1985, 7318; andP. F. Watkins, NSW LC, Hansard, 26 November1985, 10518; the latter decries the Commission’s “outrageous decision.” Google Scholar

101.Pat Hills, NSW LA, Hansard, 19 November1985, 9843. Google Scholar

102.P. F. Watkins,NSW LC, Hansard, 26 November1985, 10515. Google Scholar

103.“Removal of Appeal Rights,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, June1986, 1. Google Scholar

104.Peter Collins, NSW LA, Hansard, 20 November1985, 10089, 10091. Google Scholar

105.J. C. J. Matthews,NSW LC, Hansard, 20 November1985, 10535;Elisabeth Kirkby, NSW LC, Hansard, 20 November1985, 10536–37. Google Scholar

106.Helen Grant, “‘Conned’ Retailers Seek Redress over Weekend Wage Bill,” Australian Financial Review, 22 April1986, 36. Google Scholar

107.Helen Grant, “SDA Appeals to Wran as Big Five Stand Firm,” Australian Financial Review, 23 April1986, 37. Google Scholar

108.Re Shop Employees’ (Major General Shops) (State) Award, inIndustrial Reports 17(1988):155. Google Scholar

109.Brad Norington andKeith Martin, “Shops Face New Threat as Stocks Run Out,” Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November1986, 3. Google Scholar

110.A direct appeal from the Tribunal to the Commission was ruled out by a privative clause inserted by theIndustrial Arbitration (Further Amendment) Act 1986(NSW). The peculiarity of this provision is further evidence of the influence of the SDA on the Labor Government. Google Scholar

111.The absent assessor was ironically the employer’s nominee, the aforementioned Mr Lawrence;Lyons, “An Appealing Outcome,” 117. Google Scholar

112.G J Coles & Co Ltd & Ors v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal & Ors, inNew South Wales Law Reports 7(1986):503. Google Scholar

113. Re Shop Employees’ (Major General Shops) (State) Award, 155. Google Scholar

114. Ibid., 157. Google Scholar

115.“Monthly Update,” The Retail Trader, June1986, 1. Google Scholar

116. The Australian Industrial Law Review 30, no. 12(1988):203. Google Scholar

117. Ibid., 203–204. Google Scholar

118. Ibid. Google Scholar

119.Deputy-President Wells noted that the evidence before him “indicated that in some instances there had been a tendency to take the easy way out of staffing problems by simply engaging casuals”;Ibid., 204. This sentiment reveals a judicial myopia regarding the processes unfolding. The increasing precarity of retail employment relationships was not at base a matter of individual employers choosing to “take the easy way out.” Rather, it was the essence of the fundamental change in the wage-labour nexus underway, a transformation spear-headed in the retail sector. Google Scholar

120. Ibid., 204. Google Scholar

121. Ibid. Google Scholar

122. Ibid. Google Scholar

123.“Success for RTA,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, 1988(Special Edition), 1. Google Scholar

124.Employer joy at the decision can be gleaned from the triumphant special issue ofThe Retail Traders’ News Bulletin;Ibid. Google Scholar

125.John Fahey, NSW LA, Hansard, 13 October1988, 2270. Google Scholar

126. Ibid. Google Scholar

127.A. B. Manson,NSW LC, Hansard, 7 December1988, 4508. Google Scholar

128.“Industrial Commission Increases Wages,” The Retail Traders’ News Bulletin, 1988(Special Edition), 1. Google Scholar

129.Heino, “The State, Class and Occupational Health and Safety,” 162. Google Scholar

130.Such as OHS;Ibid. Google Scholar

131.Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism(:Verso, 1987), 15. Google Scholar

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